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Abstract 
This paper provides new evidence for the relationship between the nature of banking relationships, managerial 
ownership and operational performance in supporting reciprocal effects between these variables in the context of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). A simultaneous equations model was applied to a sample of 4,163 Portuguese 
SMEs and to cross-section data. Evidence was found that these attributes provide simultaneous relations among 
themselves. In particular, on the one hand, our results support a negative effect of the number of banks with which 
the company works and managerial ownership on operational performance. On the other hand, the number of banks 
with which the company maintains a relationship is positively conditioned by operational performance and 
negatively by managerial ownership. In turn, managerial ownership is negatively conditioned by operational 
performance and the nature of the banking relationship. 
Keywords: nature of the banking relationship, managerial ownership, operational profitability, simultaneous effects 
1. Introduction 
In recent years small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been the object of attention on the part of numerous 
works by virtue of their importance in terms of economic activity, job creation, innovation and ability to generate 
wealth in most economies (Behr et al., 2013). In market systems, issues of survival and the complexity and 
dynamism of the business environment require an increasingly deep understanding of organizations in general and 
SMEs in particular, as well as the variables or factors that are key to their performance. Particularly, in economies 
where bank financing is especially important in funding enterprises in general and SMEs specifically, understanding 
how the nature of the banking relationship may affect access to credit as well as its cost to SMEs, and hence their 
performance, as well as the reciprocal effects, without ignoring the role that managerial ownership may establish 
with those dimensions, is of particular importance for both business and for the conduct of economic and fiscal 
policy in those economies. 
There is a significant literature that defends the role of banking supervision in solving the problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, especially experienced by SMEs, contributing either positively or negatively to their 
performance (e.g., Ongena and Smith, 2001, Chortareas et al., 2012, Yu et al., 2012, Barth et al., 2013). However, 
neither can it not be ignored that the nature of the established banking relations (bilateral vs. multilateral) is 
conditioned by a set of business features, among which performance (Detragiache et al., 2000, Farinha and Santos, 
2002, Carletti, 2004) and managerial ownership (Stulz, 1988, Vilaseca, 2002) stand out. 
Besides establishing close relationships with banks, SMEs are characterized by a substantial involvement of the 
equity holders in governing bodies, from which discretionary management rises with expected impacts on 
performance (Johnson et al., 2000, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). In turn, it cannot be forgotten that performance 
may induce involvement of managing bodies in the company's equity and leading to convergence of interests 
(Demsetz, 1983). Thus, the existing literature also does not fail to suggest relationships of reciprocal causality 
between managerial ownership and performance (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983b, Miguel et al., 2004), supporting the 
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hypotheses of convergence of interests and expropriation as well as the adjustment made by the directors in their 
share of the equity relative to the profitability obtained (Mehran, 1995). Alongside a number of more recent studies 
(e.g., Chen et al., 2006, Yu et al., 2012) argues that under some circumstances the negative impact associated with 
the entrenchment of management on performance can be mitigated with greater monitoring and supervision on the 
part of the bank supervision and monitoring. 
In this context, the integrated study of the nature of banking relationships, managerial ownership and operational 
performance is of particular importance in the context of SMEs, both due to the weight that the bank financing 
assumes for these companies, and to the specificities they contain in terms of information asymmetry, the value of 
the information produced and interests, which sometimes conflict, among the various business agents. Thus, the main 
goal of this study focuses on the integrated study of the nature of the banking relationship, managerial ownership and 






Figure 1. A conceptual framework 
This paper is organized as follows: besides this introduction there are four additional sections. The second section is 
devoted to reviewing the relevant literature on the topic and formulating research hypotheses. The third section turns 
to the methodology. The fourth section presents the sample, the data and the indicators used to measure each of the 
attributes considered in this study. The authors present and discuss the results in the fifth section. Finally, the sixth 
section presents the main conclusions of this study. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses 
2.1 Nature of the Banking Relationship versus Performance 
The difficulties felt by SMEs in being financed combined with the scant possibility of access to capital markets, 
means that the credit market constitutes their main source of financing. The study of banking intermediation, 
therefore, gains particular relevance, especially when it comes to evaluating its contribution to SME performance 
(Boot, 2000). 
The banking relationship is justified by imperfections which occur in financial markets and contributes significantly 
to their reduction. The legitimacy of financial intermediation arises from imperfections in these markets, namely: i) 
transaction costs, ii) information asymmetries and iii) agency costs (Ang et al., 2000, Drucker and Puri, 2009, Berger 
et al., 2010). Transaction costs result not only from expenses resulting from producing financial assets, stemming 
from the physical and temporal non-coincidence of interests on the part of the different agents involved, as well as 
costs relating to administrative processing and information acquisition, aspects which the financial intermediary 
performs with comparative advantages. As for the problems arising from information asymmetry, those generated a 
priori, due to the difficulty in assessing the quality of credit applicants, should be distinguished from those which are 
a posteriori, resulting from the difficulty in controlling them. This second aspect relates to what the agency theory 
postulates. That is, the incentive that the company may have to behave opportunistically generates significant agency 
costs which the financial intermediary can reduce by supervision and control developed in the course and deepening 
of the relationship. Thus, firms subject to greater information asymmetry place particular importance on the nature of 
the relationships they establish with their creditors. As Diamond (1984) well recognizes, financial intermediation 
plays an important role in collecting information and reducing monitoring costs, as there is a strong incentive for 
financing through bank debt. The banks control the financing granted and supervise the company’s activities through 
celebrating contracts and frequent interactions. In turn, bank loans signal the company’s creditworthiness to other 
market agents and reduce information costs in concluding new contracts (Fama, 1985, Forte and Peña, 2011). 
Operational 
performance 
Nature of banking 
relationship 
Managerial ownership 
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Thus, the banking relationship provides benefits to stakeholders in the process insofar as it facilitates the exchange of 
information, grants greater negotiating flexibility, increases availability of credit and provision of services which best 
meet the needs of the company. Nevertheless, the banking relationship with a reduced, or at the limit with just one 
bank, also has associated disadvantages, particularly when the benefits of the relationship are not equally divided 
among the parties. These disadvantages arise from the appropriation of benefits either for the company – the soft 
budgeting problem, or for the bank – the hold-up problem. 
In this context, the literature has looked into the effect that the nature of the banking relationship (bilateral vs. 
multilateral) may have on corporate performance and either positive or negative effects have been argued (Yu et al., 
2012). To obtain credit, SMEs need to provide information to the financing institution, so that it will assess the 
investment to be financed. This information is often strategic in nature and disclosure may affect the company’s 
competitiveness (Detragiache et al., 2000). In this sense, Yosha (1995) argues that firms with relevant information 
prefer to establish bilateral relations, where frequent interaction with a single stock or a very small number of banks 
is preferred so as to preserve confidentiality. Moreover, the economies of scale achieved by the bilateral banking 
relationship in the production of information, coupled with the fact that it is not easily transmissible, gives the bank 
holding the information the power to intervene in the company’s management, ensuring greater availability of funds, 
providing a more favourable rate of interest and requiring less collateral and/or imposing fewer clauses in financing 
contracts (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). These aspects are particularly valued by smaller, younger and more opaque 
firms (with greater difficulty in demonstrating their true quality to outside investors), which rely almost exclusively 
on financing by bank credit. 
Exclusivity of the banking relationship increases investment in informational reciprocity and reduces duplication of 
costs, thereby contributing to maximizing enterprise value (relationship hypothesis). However, the exclusive 
relationship confers monopoly power to the bank, possibly encouraging opportunistic behaviour (hold-up hypothesis). 
In turn, the multilateral relationship, reduces the hold-up problem, but also reduces incentives for intensifying the 
relationship. Among the actions that the company can develop to improve performance, maintaining continuity of the 
relationship with the financial institution is stressed. A small number of financial institutions or, in the extreme a 
single bank, allows information asymmetries and financing costs to be reduced and facilitates access to credit. 
However, there are also arguments pointing in the opposite direction: competition between the various credit 
institutions generates benefits in terms of availability and cost of credit. These benefits outweigh those arising from 
companies working with a reduced number of banks (Agarwal and Elston, 2001, Bris and Welch, 2005, Schenone, 
2010). Nevertheless, companies will only be able to take advantage of this bank competition when it is effective and 
they have bargaining power. In this sense, Fok et al. (2004) provides empirical evidence that supports a negative 
relationship between the number of domestic banks companies work with and performance. Moreover, the financial 
constraints that SMEs may be subjected to cannot be ignored either. In many circumstances they initiate an adverse 
selection while seeking new resources, to the extent that the banks which are external to the relationship are unaware 
of the true risk and consider it too high, often refusing financing with respective impacts on performance. This 
situation particularly affects microenterprises. 
Given the arguments that point to the nature of the banking relationship having either a positive or negative effect 
(bilateral versus multilateral) in operational performance, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1: Banking relationships with a higher number of banks adversely affect SME operational performance. 
When studying the effect of the nature of the banking relationship (bilateral vs. multilateral), the effect of reciprocal 
causality cannot be ignored (Degryse and Ongena, 2001 Miguel et al., 2004, Fok et al., 2004). If, on the one hand, 
the concentration of banking relationships with a limited number of banks – and at the limit a single bank (bilateral 
relationship) – helps reduce the costs of information and prevents its disclosure to competitors, improving corporate 
performance; on the other, the relations established are conditioned by a set of business features among which 
performance stands out. Thus, banking relationships affect performance (Ongena and Smith, 2001) and this, in turn, 
the nature of those relationships (Yosha, 1995, Detragiache et al., 2000). 
If there is reason to believe that the best performing companies prefer bilateral financing, thereby reducing the 
dissemination of confidential information to third parties (Yosha, 1995, Von Thadden, 1995), there are also 
arguments in the opposite direction. For example, Detragiache et al. (2000) and Carletti (2004) argue that firms with 
better performance and higher growth opportunities favour multilateral banking relationships so as to reduce 
liquidity risk. In this sense, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H2: Operational performance positively affects the number of banks that SMEs have a relationship with. 
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2.2 Managerial Ownership versus Operational Performance 
The effect of managerial ownership on the company’s operational performance has not garnered consensus in the 
existing literature. As prescribed by agency theory, the separation between ownership and control creates conflicts of 
interest between investors (owners and creditors) and directors, hence the need to develop internal and external 
control mechanisms able to coordinate them, given the difficulty of concluding complete contracts to resolve 
disparities (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990, Prowse, 1995). In this sense, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983a) argue that a greater percentage of equity held by those in management positions enables an alignment 
of interests between managers and other owners with a positive effect on performance in reducing monitoring costs 
and the likelihood of suboptimal decisions (convergence of interests hypothesis). Nevertheless, high levels of 
managerial ownership may generate costs as mentioned by Fama and Jensen (1983b). Owning a substantial share of 
the equity gives the director the power to vote and/or significant influence. This may result in non-compliance with 
the objectives of maximizing value – expropriation hypothesis. Thus, high levels of managerial ownership can lead 
to problems of the management team’s entrenchment and obtaining private benefits with negative impacts on 
performance (Schulze et al., 2001, Claessens et al., 2002, Miguel et al., 2004). 
According to Berger et al. (1997), management entrenchment reflects the situation in which directors are immune to 
the discipline imposed by a wide range of control mechanisms. The level of entrenchment can be enhanced by several 
factors, emphasizing the weight of ownership held by the directors and their voting power in decision-making (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983b, Bebchuk et al., 2009). The opportunistic behaviour of directors, combined with a reduced 
likelihood of hostile takeover, makes them virtually immune to monitoring (Stulz, 1988). 
In the case of SMEs where management is assumed by the actual owners, the interests of the principal and agent are 
aligned. However, when separation does exist, it creates strong incentives for the free-rider and entrenchment problems 
to arise on the part of family members in order to obtain private benefits, thereby negatively conditioning company 
performance. This situation is enhanced in the continental governance model (where the majority owner is a family 
industrial or financial group in nature). Conflicts of interest are thus higher than those found in the Anglo-Saxon model, 
where institutional investors (e.g., investment funds, pensions or insurance companies) show lower levels of conflict 
with the investee. Nevertheless, the problem of supervision remains, particularly in the presence of private information 
(Gedajlovic and Shapiro 1998, Franks and Mayer, 1998). Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H3: Managerial ownership adversely affects operational performance.  
The ownership held by directors commonly arises from results generated by their decisions. Managerial ownership is 
thus often a reward granted to the director depending on corporate results (Mehran, 1995, Fernández Méndez et al., 
2011). However, in the context of SMEs in general and in family businesses in particular, where there is only a slight 
separation between the private assets of the owners and those of the company, ownership concentration frequently 
leads to the controlling owner performing activities designed to extract private benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 
La Porta et al., 2000). Performance, therefore, loses relevance as an inducer of greater participation of management 
in the company's equity and for convergence of interests as prescribed by agency theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 
La Porta et al., 2000). In this sense, some studies (e.g., Demsetz, 1983, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) suggest that the 
controlling owners tend to defend their own interests by treating the company as a tool to provide employment for 
the family or as a way of financing it, limiting management positions to family members. Thus, family ties, the 
absence of a clear distinction between personal and corporate assets as well as the practices of expropriation, held by 
the controlling family and reduced professional management (allocation of management positions to household 
members) mean that operational performance does not constitute enough of an “attraction” to induce greater 
participation of the directors in corporate ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003, Arosa et al., 2010). 
According this background, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H4: Operational performance negatively influences managerial ownership.  
2.3 The Nature of the Banking Relationship versus Managerial Ownership 
The third dimension in the study relates to the relationships established between managerial ownership and the 
nature of banking relationships. In the previous paragraph our attention turned to the possible effect of managerial 
ownership on performance in the light of the convergence of interests and entrenchment hypotheses. To the extent 
that the ownership is shared by a larger number of owners, supervision and control acquire “public good” 
characteristics and the free-riding problem arises (Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1988, Demsetz, 1983), so that control 
rights should be concentrated in a small number of investors, the credit institution playing an important role in the 
daily management of the company. The exercise of supervision is relevant when the bank’s stake becomes large 
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enough to allow it to internalize corporate control costs and reduce agency problems, insofar as it acquires explicit 
control rights over noncompliant companies and ability to intervene in credit renewal. Simultaneously, the creditor's 
rights may not coincide with those of the other stakeholders conditioning wealth distribution. In the presence of 
imperfections in the market, resulting from asymmetric information, the credit institution may use its power to 
extract income, to the extent that it creates substitution costs, discouraging demand for alternative sources of 
financing. Management participation in the equity and the decisions taken by them can change the control exercised 
by creditors: if the initiative is valuable, excessive surveillance and control by the credit institution may trigger 
adverse consequences. In this sense, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H5: Managerial ownership adversely affects the nature of the banking relationship. 
As for the relationship between the nature of banking relationships and managerial ownership, it should be assessed 
bearing in mind the role that supervision of the banking system plays in reducing the costs associated with the 
management entrenchment, benefiting the relationship with the equity holders, to the extent this contributed to 
reducing private benefits and making investments with lower returns. In turn, insofar as the financial institution often 
interacts with the management team, it obtains privileged (confidential) information about the company’s 
performance, reducing information asymmetries (Benston and Smith, 1976). 
Thus, banking supervision is an important mechanism for reducing agency costs. Nevertheless, the objectives 
defined by the different stakeholders in the company’s governance, do not always coincide. In this framework, the 
literature has sought to analyze them, bearing in mind the effect of asset substitution, advocated by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). According to Diaz et al. (2004) banks, as lenders, do not participate in the benefits arising from a 
good corporate performance. The business agents, as owners, attempt to maximize the company’s value, generating a 
conflict with credit institutions stemming from the conservative investment policy they impose when exercising 
control. In turn, as the directors intend to have a greater operational control over decisions which banks are 
predisposed to allow, they attempt to decrease dependency on the bank, subjecting themselves thereby to greater 
restrictions, either in quantity or price, than those they would be subject to with greater control of their activity. From 
this perspective, the literature (e.g., Jensen, 1986, DeAngelo et al., 2002) shifts agency conflicts to the relationship 
that is established between creditors and directors. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H6: The nature of the banking relationship adversely affects the managerial ownership.  
3. Methodology 
Given the objectives of this study and the hypotheses to be tested, the simultaneous equation model was formulated 













Considering the dimensions in this study (operational performance, nature of the banking relationship and 
managerial ownership), there is a set of characteristics inherent to the company, which cannot be ignored, susceptible 
to affecting these very dimensions. Notably among those are the following: the size of the board, reputation, size of 
the company, capital structure as well as bank debt, the nature of ownership, capital dispersion and size of the 
lending bank, among those which have received the greatest theoretical and empirical support in the existing 
literature. 
The features of the board, particularly their size, have gained prominence in recent years both as a determinant of 
corporate performance, and the nature of the banking relationship. The influence of the size of the board on corporate 
performance is the result not only of its importance in the ownership structure, but also because it becomes a defining 
Operational performance = β10 + β11 Nature of the banking relationship + β12 Managerial ownership + 
β13 Size of the board + β14 Reputation + β15 Size of the company + β16 Capital structure + ε           
                                                                         Equation [1] 
Nature of the banking relationship = β20 + β21 Operational performance + β22 Managerial ownership + 
β23 Nature of ownership + β24 Size of the board + β25 Reputation + β26 Size of the company + β27 
Bank debt + β28 Size of bank + ε 
Equation [2]
Managerial ownership = β30 + β31 Operational performance + β32 Nature of the banking relationship + 
β33 Capital dispersion of the company+ β34 Reputation + β35 Size of the company + ε 
Equation [3]
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element of corporate decisions. The number of directors may interfere with the efficiency of supervision. While a 
greater number of directors facilitate the task of supervision, it also provides a greater variety of views (Tuggle et al. 
2010, Johnson et al. 2013). Nevertheless, there are also those who argue that a greater number of directors raises 
problems of information coordination and flow throughout the decision-making process, thereby exerting a negative 
effect on operational performance (Boone et al., 2007, Kor and Sundaramurthy 2009, Menozzi et al., 2012). 
The size of the board may be a mechanism capable of decreasing information asymmetries and increasing companies’ 
bargaining power in establishing relationships with banks (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). If the number of directors is 
associated with the size of the company, as is usually the case, the largest benefit most from multilateral banking 
relationships (Bonfim et al., 2010). As highlighted by these authors, large companies have greater bargaining power in 
their relations with credit institutions. In addition to being subject to lower information asymmetries, it is easier for 
them to establish new banking relationships, compared to small and micro enterprises. Small and micro enterprises 
have greater difficulty in establishing new banking relationships by virtue of adverse selection and greater 
informational opacity they are subject to. The high risk they carry, supervision costs and required monitoring also 
inhibit establishing new banking relationships (Degryse et al., 2011). When these costs represent a significant weight 
relative to the size of the project to be financed, banks decline credit, preferring companies that provide economies of 
scale (Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2007). In view of these arguments firm size is expected to have a 
positive effect on the number of banking relationships. 
Firm size cannot be ignored either when studying the potential determinants of performance. If it is true that 
arguments are found pointing to a positive effect of this attribute on operational performance, sustained by 
economies of scale and reduced fixed costs (James and Timotthy, 2000, Orlitzky, 2001) and in diversifying the range 
of products (services) produced (rendered) (Lau et al., 2010, Yam et al., 2011), the fact remains that arguments can 
be found pointing in the opposite direction. In small and micro enterprises in particular, an individual or family, 
characterized by a reduced propensity to risk and very careful analysis of investments, simultaneously perform the 
role of owner and manager, possibly conditioning performance. On the other hand, this coincidence between 
ownership and management contribute to minimizing the agency costs of equity which naturally translates into a 
positive effect on these companies’ performance (Andres, 2008). 
When considering the firm size attribute, it is necessary to control its effect on ownership held those in management 
positions (directors) – managerial ownership. Demsetz (1983) underscores that as the company increases in scale, 
ownership tends to become more dispersed via a greater openness of equity and participation held by those in 
management positions (directors) tends to decrease. However, when we turn to SMEs, we must not forget that most 
of these companies are based on a family-type ownership structure; the family strongly resists relinquishing the 
position of steering the company’s destiny. Nevertheless, as the business becomes more complex, difficulty in 
recruiting necessary efficient management capabilities from within the family becomes more evident (Górriz, 2002). 
Oftentimes, the family lacks the skills and capabilities required to keep direction in the hands of the family group. 
Thus, in these situations the reluctance of the family to relinquish control over the company’s destiny will impose 
significant costs on the company (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, La Porta et al., 1999). To overcome this constraint, the 
company recruits professional managers, who have no stake in the company’s equity, to take control of the 
company’s destiny. This line of argument also leads us to consider the size of the company and dispersion of its 
capital as potential determinants of managerial ownership. 
Among the control variables considered in the model, company age is also highlighted as a determinant in the three 
study dimensions. According to Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and Sakai et al. (2010) company age reflects its 
reputation conveyed to the open market, constituting a valuable complement to private information that banks 
acquire during the relationship, facilitating, among other things, risk analysis by banks outside the relationship. In 
reflecting public information about the company’s survival and maturity, it is an indicator that commitments have 
been met. Thus, it constitutes an intangible asset that is perceived by banks outside the relationship without incurring 
the high costs of collecting and processing information, contributing to increasing the number of banking 
relationships. 
However, it is important to realize that companies, like people, have a finite life expectancy (Reis and Augusto, 
2013). As such, on the one hand, age is maturity and experience with regards to the past; on the other, it also reflects 
the number of years that the company can expect to generate cash flows and results. Moreover, in the case of SMEs, 
age may also be associated with the generational effect resulting from generations who come after the founder being 
incorporated into the firm with the due effects both on performance and managerial ownership. With increasing age 
the probability that the company’s ownership will be shared by an increasing number of individuals increases, as 
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well as the conflicts that can arise if interests are not aligned. Oftentimes operational choices driven by personal 
preferences have effects which affect company performance (Sharmaa et al., 2007). 
Fragmentation of ownership associated with the generational effect and potential conflicts of interest also has effects 
on managerial ownership. Management, provided by the founder in young companies and, having faced the problem 
of succession in older ones, is allocated among household members and professional managers with little or no 
equity participation (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, Barontini and Caprino, 2006). Thus, the potential negative effect 
that the company’s age may exercise on managerial ownership cannot be ignored. 
SMEs are faced with severe limitations when they require external financing. Its ownership structure, usually 
concentrated, is a serious impediment to issuing new equity, due to the reluctance of the current owners to share 
control of the company with new owners. Thus, given the strong constraints that SMEs face in access to external 
financing (either through new equity or through debt) its capital structure may be an important signaling vehicle in 
relation to the company’s asset quality and its projects. It may thus constitute a differentiating element in corporate 
terms. However, let us not forget that the context of these companies, by virtue of the asymmetries they are subject to, 
sets them up for adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which naturally translates into higher credit cost and 
even rationing. This credit rationing, as Myers and Majluf (1984) point out, may make acceptance of value creating 
projects unviable. Even the viability of the company itself may come into question, with effects on operational 
profitability. Moreover, scarcity of equity gives it a very high debt structure, creating strong incentives in the 
banking system to interfere in day-to-day management decisions in the medium and long term, with impacts on 
operational performance (DeAngelo et al., 2002). In the face of these arguments, capital structure is considered a 
determinant on operational performance. However, the natural tendency of SMEs to overcome the credit constraints 
they face by increasing the number of banks with which they relates cannot be ignored, since the greater and more 
concentrated the debtor position, the greater the appetite for lenders to control business management 
(Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2010). So, in order to control this possible behaviour, bank debt is 
included in the model as a determinant of the nature of the banking relationship.  
Finally, the model also includes the nature of ownership and bank size as determinants of the number of bank 
relationships. Major owners, such as families in the context of SMEs, have two important effects on the nature of the 
banking relationship. On the one hand, as mentioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983b), 
Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2007) and Andres (2008), among others, in assuming a supervisory role, major owners 
significantly reduce information asymmetries and agency costs, facilitating an increase in the number of banking 
relationships. On the other hand, when these owners supply personal collateral, this facilitates new banking 
relationships (Ono and Uesugi, 2009, Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). 
As highlight by Detragiache et al. (2000), the size of the bank, by virtue of the breadth of services rendered, can also 
constrain the nature of the banking relationship. Furthermore, smaller banks face increased difficulties when exposed 
to liquidity shocks, showing greater fragility, leading companies which are financed by these banks to establish 
multiple bank relationships (Detragiache et al., 2000). Thus, the size of the lending bank is expected to have a 
negative effect on the number of banking relationships. 
4. Sample, Data and Variables 
4.1 Sample and Data 
Selecting SMEs as an object of study arises from the fact that they possess a set of particular characteristics, which 
separate them from others. Firstly, because in most cases they are unlisted companies, they face greater information 
problems when compared to larger enterprises. In smaller, normally younger, and more informationally opaque firms, 
the inability to credibly disclose their quality, associated with the tenuous separation between ownership and 
management, greatly increases information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Thus, the value of the 
banking relationship, based on reciprocity of soft information, is particularly relevant to the context of these 
companies. Secondly, SMEs are limited in obtaining external funds from financial institutions to the extent that the 
market is accessible only to large companies both, by virtue of transaction costs, and by the information asymmetries 
that small firms are exposed to. Thirdly, these firms are of particular importance in the fabric of most entrepreneurial 
economies, and Portugal is no exception. According to a study by the IAPMEI Planning and Studies Directorate in 
February 2008, SMEs represent 99.6% of the Portuguese business units, creating 75.2% of private employment and 
performing over half of all turnover (56.4%) generating about 2.1 million jobs and over €170.3 billion turnover. 
The study is carried out on a set of non-financial firms over the period from 2003 to 2007. The main source of 
information was the IBAS (Iberian Balances Analysis System version 33.1, update 110 – October 2008), which 
contains accounting and financial information on Portuguese and Spanish firms. Among the firms listed in the IBAS 
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database: i) those without accounting information during the review period were eliminated, ii) only those that met 
the conditions set by the Bank of Portugal in their analyses (total assets, equity, turnover and positive GVA) were 
included, iii) those which were not economically viable, reflected by a positive operational profitability, were 
excluded iv) only those which met the conditions for SMEs to under Decree-Law No. 372/2007 (Note 1) were taken 
into account, v) all those where it was not possible to collect information on the number of credit institutions they 
work with were excluded, vi) companies in the financial sector were removed and, finally, vii ) only firms where 
capital distribution information was available were retained. Given these criteria, a final sample of 4,163 firms was 
reached. 
Table 1 presents some characteristics of the companies in the sample: distribution of companies by number of 
employees, job creation and turnover by scaled number of employees. Analysis of this table indicates that 89% of the 
companies have fewer than 50 employees. Nevertheless, it is those with 10 or more workers that absorb 90% of the 
labour and have 83% of turnover. It is worth noting that a significant number of companies (43%) have fewer than 
10 employees, but their contribution to generate business and create value is of little importance (17%). Regarding 
companies with 50 or more people, though their number is reduced (11%), they absorb 45% of the workforce and 
account for 36% turnover. 
Table 1. Sample: Main characteristics by class according to number of employees, average values 2003-2007 
Variables Total Less than 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 
 Value Value % Value % Value %
Companies (No.) 4,163 1,777 43 1,928 46 458 11
Employees (No.) 94,539 9,504 10 42,422 45 42,612 45
Turnover (103Eur) 12,313,887 2,037,058 17 5,796,657 47 4,480,172 36
4.2 Variables  
Based on the literature, the indicators presented were selected to measure each of the attributes relevant to this study.  
The corporate performance attribute is often assessed either by market indicators, either by accounting information. 
SMEs generally do not participate in the stock market, being financed primarily through bank intermediation. It 
therefore becomes particularly difficult to obtain information to allow assessment from a market prospective. Thus, 
those who study SMEs find themselves naturally compelled to resort to accounting information for the purpose of 
measuring this attribute. The following are among the most commonly used indicators: i) operational return on assets 
(ROA) (e.g., Castelli et al., 2012, Wang and Sarkis, 2013) and ii) return on equity (ROE) (e.g., Ding et al., 2012). 
With arguments found in the literature in mind, ROA was chosen. This choice is based on the fact that it allows the 
performance of total source of funds (internal or external) to be assessed and it is one of the best indicators for 
comparative analysis between companies. On the other hand, it determines financial survival in the long run and the 
ability to attract capital, either internally or externally. Joh (2003) even argues for the superiority of this indicator 
compared to those based on market information, stating that: i) stock price does not reflect the totality of information 
available in the absence of an efficient market values, ii) there is empirical evidence that accounting profitability is 
more strongly associated with the firm’s survival than Tobin’s Q, and iii) it allows the performance of companies not 
traded in capital markets to be assessed. An additional advantage of this indicator stems from the fact that it is not 
directly influenced by the company’s capital structure, largely expressing how the company makes use of its assets. 
According to what is unanimously accepted, this indicator is operationalized by dividing operational returns (OR) by 
total assets (TA). 
To measure the nature of the banking relationship (bilateral vs. multilateral), the literature has relied primarily on 
three classes of indicators: number of banks, duration of the relationship and extent of services provided (e.g., 
Degryse and Ongena, 2001, Bris and Welch, 2005, Carletti et al., 2007). However, given the purpose of this study, 
we chose to use the number of banks with which the company works along the lines of Fok et al. (2004) and Yu et al. 
(2012). Managerial ownership is measured by the share of equity held by the board (Anderson and Reeb, 2003, 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
Regarding the nature of ownership, in particular the identity of the family versus non-family owner, in line with what 
is advocated by Ortiz-Molina and Peñas (2007), Andres (2008), among others, a dichotomous variable was chosen. It 
takes the value of 1 (one) when ownership held by the family is greater than 50%, and the value of 0 (zero) otherwise. 
The capital dispersion attribute is measured by the number of participants in the company’s capital/equity in 
accordance with Holderness (2003) and Thomsen (2005), among others. The size of the board attribute is evaluated 
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by the number of directors in line with Linck et al., (2008), Brick and Chidambaran (2010) and Wintoki et al., (2012), 
among others. Business size has also been measured by a very broad set of indicators. For example, Degryse and 
Ongena (2001) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) consider the logarithm of sales, Berger and Udell (1995), total net 
assets, Cardone et al. (2005), the number of employees. In our study business size is measured by the logarithm of 
total net assets as recommended by Petersen and Rajan (1994), De Bodt et al. (2005), and Andres (2008), among 
others. In accordance with Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), and Sharmaa et al. (2007), among others, age was 
chosen to measure the company’s reputation, i.e., the number of years since its establishment. Capital structure has 
also been measured by a wide range of indicators, which can be separated into two groups: one includes those that 
take into account total assets (application of resources) and the sources of funds; others focus only on the latter. In 
line with Fok et al. (2004) and Augusto et al. (2011), among others, our choice fell on one of the indicators included 
in the second group, i.e., the relationship between liabilities and equity. With regards to the bank debt, our choice fell 
on the ratio between the bank liabilities and total liabilities in line with Houston and James (2001). Finally, the bank 
size attribute can be measured by a number of indicators. Among these it is worth highlighting total assets of the 
credit institution, the amount of credit granted and the resources raised. Following Detragiache et al. (2000) and 
Haan and Poghosyan (2012) our choice fell on average value of assets of the banking institutions involved in the 
relationship. 
Table 2 presents a summary of all of the indicators used and how they were operationalized.  
Table 2. Attributes and indicators 
Endogenous 
attributes  
Indicator Analytical Expression 
Operational 
performance  
Operational return on 
assets  
Operational returns / Assets 
Nature of the 
banking 
relationship  
Number of banks Number of banks the company works with  
Managerial 
ownership  
Ownership held by those 
in management positions 
(directors) 
Ownership held by those in management positions 




Indicator Analytical Expression 
Nature of 
ownership 
Family Dichotomous variable that assumes the value of one if 
at least 50% is owned by a family, otherwise it is zero Other 
Capital dispersion  Number of owners Number of owners 
Size of board Number of directors Number of directors 
Business size Asset logarithm Natural logarithm of total net assets 
Reputation Age Number of years since founding 
Capital structure Debt Liabilities / Equity 
Bank debt Bank debt Bank liabilities / Liabilities 
Bank size Bank assets Average value of assets of banks the company 
maintains relationships with 
5. Results and Discussion 
Initially, the estimation of the simultaneous equations model is assessed in terms of its identification and structure, 
since this affects the estimation method to be adopted. The endogeneity of each dependent variable is assessed as 
well. 
A simultaneous equations model is identified when estimating the parameters of each of its equations does not result 
from a combination of the remaining parameters. That is, the identification problem arises when different sets of 
structural coefficients are compatible with the same set of data. Evaluating the identification of a system of 
simultaneous equations can be gauged by the conditions of order and rank (Gujarati and Porter 2008). Given the 
condition of order each equation of the model is identified. Bearing in mind the structure of the model, the first 
equation excludes four variables, the second, two and the third, five (corresponding to the missing variables in each 
equation, but included in the others). To ensure the condition of rank, at least one non-zero determinant of order 1 
must be obtained from the coefficients of the excluded variables in each equation, but included in the others. These 
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coefficients may be chosen to form a determinant which is necessarily non-zero. Thus, from the general principles of 
identification, we have an identified system of equations. The two-stage least squares method (2SLS) is 
recommended for their estimation. Nevertheless, the three-stage least squares method (3SLS) yields more efficient 
estimates for the parameters than the two-stage method (2SLS) (Gujarati and Porter, 2008). The 3SLS method 
applies the GLS (Generalized Least Squares) methodology, an extension of two-stage least squares, to a system of 
equations which was estimated with the 2SLS method. 
The use of the 3SLS estimation method involves the following steps: 1) the reduced system is estimated by the OLS 
(Ordinary Least Squares) method to obtain the estimated values of the endogenous variables; 2) the estimated values 
of the endogenous variables are substituted in the structural form of the system; then, the structural equations are 
estimated by the OLS method, and 3) the GLS method is applied to estimate the equations together (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 2000). Because the 3SLS estimates the simultaneous equations jointly, it is more efficient than 2SLS, 
which is why this method has been adopted to estimate the proposed model. 
With identification of the model assured, in a second phase, the endogenous dimensions are assessed. Given this goal 
each of the equations of the model was estimated individually using the method of ordinary least squares 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Considering the sample and the average values of the variables for the 2003–2007 period, Table 
3 presents the results of the individual estimation of each equation. At a significance level of 5%, the variables 
considered dependents in each equation appear as independents the remaining equations of the model. When the 
model was evaluated as a whole, the F statistic shows that, for a significance level of 1%, the null hypothesis of the 
coefficients of the independent variables considered in each model is to be rejected. Through the Durbin-Watson test 
the lack of correlation between the residual random variables is analyzed, i.e., if their covariance is zero, 
E≠ . Since the value of the test model is approximately 2 (1,995, 1,984, 1,938 for equation 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively) it was concluded that there was no autocorrelation between residues. When bias of the results is 
assessed by virtue of multicollinearity through the variance inflation factor (VIF), the highest values obtained were 
1,664 (equation 1), 2,127 (equation 2) and 1,356 (equation 3), thus ensuring the absence of significant correlation 
between the independent variables. 
Table 3. Endogeneity study – estimation results: ordinary least squares 
 Operational performance
[Equation 1] 






t Sig. Beta 
Coeffic. 
t Sig. Beta 
Coeffic. 
t Sig.
Constant 0.13064 23.420 *** -0.42293 -3.197 *** 128.41 44.040 ***
Operational 
performance  -0.90604 -3.045 *** -80.221 -9.002 ***
Nature of banking rel. -0.00458 -5.847 *** 2.2892 5.008 ***
Managerial ownership -0.00021 -8.011 *** 0.00165 2.549 **  
Nature of ownership  0.19079 2.576 **  
Capital dispersion   -1.8227 -4.477 ***
Size of board 0.00184 3.841 *** 0.08471 8.863 ***  
Reputation -0.00029 -3.820 *** 0.01047 7.274 *** -0.1339 -3.024 ***
Business size -0.00370 -4.527 *** 0.34451 22.83 *** -6.6479 -15.200 ***
Capital structure -0.00074 -7.444 ***  
Bank debt  1.16895 12.40 ***  
Bank size  -7.396e-09 -11.20 ***  
Adjusted R Square 0.052 0.320 0.083 
Durbin-Watson 1.995 1.984 1.938 
F 39.15 245.63 76.19 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. 4,163 4,163 4,163 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level. 
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The results obtained from the various estimations clearly indicate the existence of endogeneity between operational 
performance, the nature of the banking relationship and managerial ownership. The relationships established in the 
estimation of each equation, acquire increased justification when comprehensively interpreted in the context of a 
simultaneous equations model. Table 4 summarizes the results in the estimation of the simultaneous equations model 
formulated using the three-stage least squares method (3SLS). 
Table 4. Results of simultaneous system 
 Operational performance
[Equation 1] 






t Sig. Coeffic. 
Beta 
t Sig. Coeffic. 
Beta 
t Sig.
Constant 0.19000 28.810 *** -1.5292 -3.687 *** 221.190 27.620 ***
Operational 
performance  7.43704 2.535 ** -1128.83 -17.570 ***
Nature of banking rel. -0.01152 -4.013 *** -11.4981 -3.429 ***
Managerial ownership -0.00085 -31.360 *** -0.00769 -2.512 **  
Nature of ownership  1.16246 4.652 ***  
Capital dispersion   -0.49662 -1.247
Size of board 0.00015 0.468 0.09476 8.875 ***  
Reputation -0.00018 -2.081 ** 0.01166 6.864 *** -0.21403 -2.299 **
Business size -0.00309 -2.103 ** 0.37028 19.17 *** -4.24785 -2.659 ***
Capital structure -4.783e-05 -0.717  
Bank debt  1.58488 8.752 ***  
Bank size  -7.535e-09 -10.940 ***  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level. 
The results clearly show the existence of simultaneity between operational performance, the nature of the banking 
relationship and managerial ownership expressed by the significance obtained for each variable in the estimation of 
the remaining variables (α = 5%). 
The simultaneous equations model not only allows us to analyze the interdependent relationships between 
operational performance, the nature of the banking relationship and managerial ownership, but it also allows us to 
test the causal relationships that have been cited in the literature, between the independent variables and the 
endogenous variables in each equation. Interpretation of the results will be done at two levels: one regarding 
interdependent relationships established between the endogenous variables, and the other regarding the effect of the 
control variables included in each of the equations in the endogenous variables. 
i) Nature of the banking relationship versus operational performance  
The first dimension under study takes into account the interdependent relations between the nature of the banking 
relationship and operational performance. The results (see Table 4) show an inverse relationship between the number 
of banks which the company works with (nature of the banking relationship) and operational performance and a 
positive effect of the operational performance on nature of the banking relationship. These results suggest that 
operational performance facilitates relationships with financial institutions, supporting the hypothesis H2. 
Increasing the number of banks has a negative impact on operational performance, suggesting that a closer banking 
relationship is associated with better operational performance. In addition to supporting hypothesis H1, this negative 
effect of the number of banks on operational performance finds support in the literature often evidenced by the 
following argument: the intensification of the relationship allows greater mutual knowledge, contributing to a 
reduction in information asymmetries, characterized by the fact that credit applicants possess private and exclusive 
information, which is difficult to transfer out of the relationship (Castelli et al., 2012). Maintaining and consolidating 
a banking relationship with a small number of entities allows adverse selection and moral hazard to be reduced 
(Abbring et al., 2003). Under these circumstances the lender bank can practice differentiated active interest rates and, 
in short, adjusted credit agreements according to risk level. It can also require a priori interest rates and less 
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collateral, as well as less restrictive clauses in drafting contracts, as advocated by Jiménez et al. (2006), Berger et al. 
(2011a) and Berger et al. (2011b), among others. 
Consolidating the relationship allows the credit institution to track the set of corrective actions initiated by the 
company during/after periods of financial difficulties – screening/monitoring (Berger and Udell, 2006, De la Torre et 
al., 2010). Thus, intensifying the banking relationship is shown to be an important competitive advantage for both 
parties: for the bank, to the extent that it appropriates private information which it accumulates over the course of the 
relationship, reducing information asymmetry; for the financed company, which, due to reduced information 
asymmetries, sees improvements in the medium term in contractual conditions, both in terms of price, and in terms 
of the amount of credit with effects positive on its financial and operational performance. These results are in line 
what has been advocated by Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) and Bharath et al. (2011). Moreover, 
Hernández-Cánovas and Martinez-Solano (2006) while studying Spanish SMEs concluded that interacting with a 
smaller number of banks they obtain funds at a lower cost. They also note that financial institutions show a clear 
tendency to increase the requirement for personal guarantees as the relationship progresses. In showing a negative 
effect of the number of banking relationships on operational performance, our results are also in line with Ongena 
and Degryse (2001) and Farinha and Santos (2002); contrary, however, to Agarwal and Elston (2001) and Weinstein 
and Yafeh (1998), among others. 
The results provide further support for a positive effect of operational performance on the number of banks the 
company works with. To the extent the company improves its performance, the number of banking relationships 
increases simultaneously. Companies improve their bargaining power and, in anticipation of hold-up problems, are 
encouraged to establish new relationships. These results corroborate the findings of Farinha and Santos (2002). For 
them, Portuguese companies with high revenues increase the number of bank relationships to minimize hold-up costs. 
In the same vein, Detragiache et al. (2000) and Carletti (2004) argue that firms with better performance and greater 
growth opportunities prefer multilateral relations so as to reduce liquidity risk. 
ii) Managerial ownership versus operational performance  
The results validate the hypothesis of simultaneity between managerial ownership and operational profitability 
expressed by the statistical significance of the estimators obtained. Analysis of the results shows that managerial 
ownership and the operational profitability have an inverse relationship. 
These results validate hypothesis H3 and are in line with those obtained by Schulze et al. (2001) and Gompers et al. 
(2010) and Zerni et al. (2010), among others, who reported that increased managerial ownership gives rise to 
entrenchment and provides directors with secure jobs and privileges that can harm corporate profitability. These 
results differ, however, from those obtained by Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) and Drakos and Bekiris (2010), whose 
results support the convergence of interests hypothesis, whereby the propensity of the director to comply with 
maximizing company value is directly proportional to ownership. 
Analysis of the results also shows that operational performance establishes an inverse relationship with managerial 
ownership, validating hypothesis H4. The family nature that is an assumed feature of a significant number of 
companies in our sample leads to their control providing sufficient non-pecuniary benefits, such that profitability 
does not constitute, in itself, a sufficient motivator for the owner’s participation in management. In companies with 
high levels of family control, decisions are less scrutinized, without public vote, and the decision to allocate benefits 
to family members may not be constrained by profitability as documented by Schulze et al. (2001, 2002) and Arosa 
et al. (2010). Furthermore, in small businesses controlled by their owners, profitability is not a strong enough 
incentive for management to participate in the company's capital (Stewart et al., 2001). Schulze et al. (2001) and Chu 
(2011) suggest that the agency costs incurred by small businesses are related to the altruistic feelings of the owners 
as family management, constituting a strong incentive to promote and sustain family ties. Our results are in line with 
those obtained by Schulze et al. (2001) and Steier (2003); however, they contradict those reported by Littuen (2000) 
and Chung and Chan (2012) who found performance had a positive effect on managerial ownership. It is worth 
noting that this positive effect of performance on managerial ownership is particularly valid in the context of large 
firms, as shown by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008). 
iii) Nature of the banking relationship versus managerial ownership  
According to the results the nature of the banking relationship and managerial ownership has an inverse relationship. 
The role played by managerial ownership in the nature of banking relationships is found to be significant and 
negative, validating hypothesis H5. Strengthening the director’s participation in the company’s capital can increase 
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the costs of supervision and control that together with lack of transparency makes them virtually immune to 
oversight, making establishing new relationships difficult.  
The negative effect of the nature of the banking relationship on managerial ownership, while validating hypothesis 
H6, provides the empirical arguments supporting that creditors exercise their control prioritizing low risk projects of. 
As underscored by Yu et al. (2012), when directors are not properly aligned with business objectives, they are not 
interested in an intense external supervision, preferring relationships with a large number of credit institutions. 
As for the second level of analysis (the effect of the control variables on the endogenous variables), the results of the 
estimation of the model provide support for most of the effect of the control variables considered. The results show 
that all independent variables that have a statistically significant effect on the representative variables of each 
equation, except for ‘size of the board’ and ‘capital structure’ as determinants of operational profitability, and 
‘capital dispersion’ were not shown to be significant with regards to managerial ownership. 
Although the size of the board was not shown to be a determinant of corporate performance, our results support the 
hypothesis that a higher number of directors adds to the company’s ability to establish new banking relationships. A 
higher number of directors are normally associated with company size. Larger firms have greater bargaining power, 
are subject to smaller asymmetries and generate economies of scale for financing banks (Hernández-Cánovas and 
Martínez-Solano, 2010). Thus, it is possible for them to benefit from multilateral banking relationships. Our results 
confirm this line of argument as they also show that firm size has a positive effect on the number of bank 
relationships. This attribute is found to be determinant regarding operational performance and managerial ownership. 
The results support an inverse effect of firm size both on its operational performance and managerial ownership. 
These results provide support for the argument that SMEs in general, and micro-enterprises in particular, experience 
the simultaneous role of the owner and manager by the same person or a limited number of people, where the line 
that separates personal from company assets is very tenuous. This circumstance leads them to be more cautious in 
considering their operational and strategic decisions, gearing up for maximizing value and minimizing operational 
and financial risk, as Riahi-Belkaoui (1998) also concludes. Moreover, the greater coincidence between owner and 
manager, a feature of small and micro enterprises, also contributes to minimizing the agency costs of equity. 
However, as these companies grow and become more complex it becomes more difficult to find the 
necessary/required management capabilities within their set of owners. This situation leads them to resort to 
professional managers under penalty of facing the consequences of keeping shareholders exercising management 
positions for which they do not meet the necessary skills or capabilities, in line with what Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
and Peng and Jiang (2010) concluded. Our results both corroborate this negative effect that firm size has on 
ownership held by whoever performs management functions, and show the negative effect expected from the 
dispersion of capital in managerial ownership. 
Company age, an indicator used to measure reputation is determinant of three dimensions under study. The negative 
effect of age on operational performance supports the thesis that companies do not have an infinite life expectancy. 
According to this line of argument, company age reflects the number of years that it can expect to produce results: 
the higher that number, the fewer years it will have to generate results. In turn, the positive effect of age on the 
number of banking relationships corroborates the thesis that age is an indicator of corporate reputation and that 
commitments are respected, as advocated in previous studies, such as Detragiache et al. (2000), Hernández-Cánovas 
and Martinez-Solano (2010), and Sakai et al. (2010). The negative effect of this attribute on managerial ownership is 
consistent with the line of argument which holds that for older companies exposed to problems of succession, 
management is shared among family members or professional directors with a reduced stake in the company’s equity 
(Barontini and Caprino, 2006). 
In line with Detragiache et al. (2000) and arguments that have stated that the credit constraints that SMEs face lead 
them to seek new banking relationships when their bank debt increases. Our results provide support for a direct 
relationship between these two variables. Nevertheless, this demand for new banking relationships is also often 
motivated by the size of the financing bank that naturally limits its range of services: the higher this is, the less 
companies need to seek new relationships, as shown by our results. 
Finally, our results also support the positive effect of the nature of ownership on the number of bank relationships. 
Families with a high percentage of capital exert effective control over the company, particularly when the primary 
owner, or one of its members, plays a major role on the board (Chu, 2011, Chung and Chan, 2012). These 
circumstances give the family business advantages in reducing opportunistic behaviour and supervision costs, 
thereby facilitating the number of banking relationships. 
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Until now the industry effect was absent from our analysis. In order to capture this possible effect, industry dummies 
were introduced into the model. The endogeneity between corporate performance, the nature of the banking 
relationship and managerial ownership is assured (see Table 5), confirming the results shown in Table 6 that the 
statistical significance of the variables does not change, as well as its effect. The estimated values are shown to be 
very similar to those obtained in Table 4, suggesting that the industry effect does not alter the relationship between 
the nature of banking relationships, managerial ownership and operational performance. 
Table 5. Endogeneity study – estimation results (ordinary least squares): industry effect 
 Operational performance
[Equation 1] 






t Sig. Coeffic. 
Beta 
t Sig. Coeffic. 
Beta 
t Sig.
Constant 0.17154 17.200 *** -0.41251 -1.954 * 107.659 18.270 ***
Operational 
performance  -0.76699 -2.543 ** -69.425 -7.709 ***
Nature of banking rel. -0.00412 -5.311 *** 2.089 4.587 ***
Managerial ownership -0.00019 -6.968 *** 0.00166 2.554 **  
Nature of ownership  0.14812 2.001 **  
Capital dispersion   -1.795 -4.390 ***
Size of board 0.00140 2.859 *** 0.08076 8.193 ***  
Reputation -0.00026 -3.392 *** 0.01044 7.208 *** -0.143 -3.218 ***
Business size -0.00315 -3.846 *** 0.34032 22.210 *** -6.646 -15.190 ***
Capital structure -0.0007 -7.298 ***  
Bank debt  1.1888 12.58 ***  
Bank size  -7.3713e-9 -11.16 ***  
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
Table 6. Result of simultaneous system – industry effect 
 Operational performance
[Equation 1] 







t Sig. Coeffic. 
Beta 
t Sig. Coeffic. 
Beta 
t Sig.
Constant 0.21830 19.370 *** -1.7959 -3.120 *** 255.366 17.300 ***
Operational 
performance  7.09080 2.320 ** -1114.29 -17.320 ***
Nature of banking rel. -0.01343 -4.679 *** -14.1667 -4.149 ***
Managerial ownership -0.00084 -32.680 *** -0.00925 -2.906 ***  
Nature of ownership  1.14914 4.503 ***  
Capital dispersion   -0.4715 -1.221
Size of board 0.00010 0.342 0.09240 8.363 ***  
Reputation -0.00015 -1.700 * 0.01107 6.554 *** -0.1764 -1.872 *
Business size -0.00202 -1.381 *** 0.35374 18.920 *** -2.94749 -1.816 *
Capital structure -4.0472e-5 -0.6236   
Bank debt  1.61642 8.517 ***  
Bank size  -7.4221e-9 -10.560 ***  
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
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6. Conclusion 
From a sample of 4,163 SMEs and cross-section data, this study provides additional empirical evidence on the 
integrated study of the nature of the banking relationship, managerial ownership and operational performance. This 
issue is of particular importance for small companies, given the role the banking system plays in funding and 
monitoring their activities, their specificities in terms of information asymmetry and conflicts of interest arising 
between investors owners and creditors) and directors. Moreover, our empirical analysis focuses on Portuguese 
SMEs, an economy where these companies represent over 99.5% of business units and where the banking system is a 
reference stakeholder. 
We began our study contemplating performance and nature of banking relationships, checking if their number 
conditions operational profitability and if this in turn affects the number of relationships, establishing reciprocity 
between them. The results provide support for theories that claim SMEs can improve their performance while 
deepening their relations with their main financing bank to the extent that it finds additional incentives to monitor the 
company’s activity and streamline the process of renegotiating debt. However, when the operational performance of 
companies improves, there are strong incentives to establish new relationships insofar as they contribute to reducing 
hold-up costs. Given the results concerning the control variables, our results suggest that, on the one hand, age and 
size of the company are inhibitors of performance; on the other, they show that the nature of ownership, managerial 
ownership, size of the board, age, business size and bank debt foster establishing new relationships while size of the 
financing/funding institution is an obstacle. 
When we turn to the inter-relationship between performance and managerial ownership, it appears they have a 
negative relationship. The results suggest that greater involvement of the directors in corporate ownership induces 
their entrenchment with negative impact on operational performance. This, in turn, does not constitute a sufficient 
incentive for greater involvement on the part of the owner in managing the business, with the consequent limited 
scrutiny decisions are subject to and the ease with which private benefits are attributed. The results also show that 
managerial ownership decreases as companies gain size and maturity. 
Taking the integrated study of the inner nature of the ownership and banking relationships into account, our results 
show that these two dimensions have an inverse relationship, meaning that strengthening participation of directors in 
business ownership makes the banking supervision mechanism less relevant, if not actually hindering it. In turn, 
when the control exercised by the credit institutions on operational activity is higher than management is predisposed 
to allow, it faces increased difficulties. 
In recognizing that information asymmetries are particularly intense for SMEs and the specificity that agency costs 
assume within these companies, the integrated study of the nature of banking relationships, managerial ownership 
and operational performance becomes particularly relevant. In our view, this study, then, takes a step forward in the 
state of the art in this field. 
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Note 
Note 1. Defines micro, small and medium businesses. The category of micro, small and medium enterprises is made 
up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and whose annual turnover does not exceed €50 million or 
whose total annual balance sheet does not exceed €43 million. A small business is defined as an enterprise which 
employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover or total annual balance sheet does not exceed €10 million. 
A micro enterprise is defined by employing less than 10 persons and whose annual turnover does not exceed €2 
million. 
